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Abstract 
 This paper examines the degree to which armed conflict interrupts oil 
production, and the effects of these supply shocks on the region-specific oil 
prices.  By measuring the effect of conflict on oil output, I aim to quantify one 
important and underexamined economic cost of conflict.  By examining the effect 
on oil prices, I hope to provide new empirical evidence on the global demand 
curve for oil and the substitutability of demand across alternative oil types. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper examines the degree to which armed conflict interrupts oil 
production, and the effects of these supply shocks on the region-specific oil 
prices.  By measuring the effect of conflict on oil output, I aim to quantify one 
important and underexamined economic cost of conflict (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 
2006).  By examining the effect on oil prices, I hope to provide new empirical 
evidence on the global demand curve for oil and the substitutability of demand 
across alternative oil types. 
The question of the relationship between war and economic performance 
is relevant because war “is associated with changes in productive capacity and 
institutions,” (Koubi, 2005) both indicators of economic well being.  Koubi’s 
analysis comes to the conclusion that while “political instability and policy 
uncertainty have significant negative effects on growth,” that “Protracted and/or 
severe wars are conducive to higher growth.” (Koubi, 2005). Intuitively, these 
results seem contradictory, which merits further examination. 
Existing literature affirms oil’s role as an essential subset of the world 
economy.  In addition to being the world’s leading energy source, oil “is critical 
to the global production of goods and service and has moved in tandem with 
changes in gross national product.” (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2006). 
Conflict often has far-reaching consequences.  This paper attempts to 
explore what those ramifications are for oil producing countries with neighbors 
who have conflict, as well as the nature and extent of these relationships through 
consideration of country- and year-level data of crude oil production and prices 
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ranging from 1960 to 2007 and how that is affected by country- and year-level 
data of armed conflict casualties ranging from 1946 to 2007.  
 Crude oil quality is not monolithic; it varies from well to well. The 
varying quality of the crude oil means that oil extracted from different wells is 
sold at different prices. 1 For example, a barrel of West Texas Intermediate crude 
oil from oil fields in the Texas region of the United States sells for a different 
price than a barrel of North Sea Brent Crude from wells offshore of the United 
Kingdom.  These blends are priced differently based on their sulfur content and 
viscosity. 
 Countries that feature blends that are primarily drilled offshore tend to 
have a higher price.  The isolation of off shore production facilities greatly 
increases the cost of production there relative to on shore facilities. However, this 
isolation can also provide a benefit. Conflict tends to be a land-based occurrence, 
so off shore production often goes unaffected by any sort of unrest. As a result, in 
conflict-prone countries that have reserves in coastal areas (Angola for example) 
typically see a disproportionately large amount of off shore facilities. 
 Exploration for reserves of crude oil has been the subject of competitive 
pursuit for decades (See Yergin, 2003). Most major discoveries on shore occurred 
in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and the consensus is that there are few remaining major 
on shore discoveries to be made. Off shore production is seen as the leading edge 
of expanding production. Because of the great amount of capital investment 
required for such undertakings, significant resources are directed to geological 
                                                 
1 Special thanks to Chris Scholz, Assistant Professor of Geology at Syracuse University. Professor 
Scholz graciously spent a great deal of time explaining the intricacies of oil production.  
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study to determine the magnitude as well as the type of crude stored in a given 
reserve. There is a disparity in the aggressiveness in pursuing these discoveries 
between privately held companies and nationalized oil exploration companies. 
Where privately held companies have to report their bottom lines to share holders, 
nationalized companies are backed by a sovereign government with somewhat 
less concern for the bottom line. Additionally, oil discoveries often are pursued 
with a nationalistic zeal by many of these companies; they are willing to take 
greater risks as part of the payoff is not just the revenue generated by the crude oil 
produced but the prestige lent by oil production. 
 Figure 1 shows the disparity in oil production in Angola over time.  The 
period prior to 2002 has limited oil production, where post-2002, oil production 
surges.  In 2002, a decades long civil war in Angola drew to a close, suggesting 
that this conflict had a depressive effect on oil production. 
Figure 2 outlines two concepts.  First, trends in Iraqi oil production are in 
itself a case study in the effect of conflict on oil production.  Second, the 
relationship between conflict and oil production in neighboring countries, Iraq 
and Kuwait, over the course of several years where multiple conflicts occurred 
illustrates the effects of neighbor conflicts.   
An ordinary least squares regression and several fixed effects regressions 
based on this data consistently show higher intensity conflict (more than 25 battle 
deaths) to have a more negative effect on oil production than lower intensity 
conflict (25 or fewer battle deaths).  Fixed effects regressions showed a 
corresponding greater increase in oil price for higher intensity conflicts. 
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Regressions accounting for neighboring conflict returned similar results, 
showing conflict within a given country of higher intensity having a more 
negative effect on output than those of less intensity.  The effect of neighboring 
conflict on output is less clear; regressions accounting for country and year fixed 
effects reveal a less positive effect on output of high intensity neighbor conflict 
compared to lower intensity neighbor conflict. 
The effects of neighbor conflict on oil prices are very similar to the effect 
of conflict on oil prices, that is slightly negative (when accounting for country and 
year fixed effects), although those results were rarely significant. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II. Data, Section 
III. Informal Results, Section IV. Model, Section VI. Results, Section VII. 
Discussion and Conclusion, Section VIII. References and Section IX. Tables and 
Figures. 
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II. Data 
 This paper combines data from British Petroleum, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, the Penn World Tables, the C.I.A. World Factbook 
and UPPSALA conflict data.  
 From the British Petroleum data set, country-level data by year was used 
for proved reserves and oil production. The production data ranges from 1966 to 
2007, where the proved reserves data runs from 1980 to 2007.  While there are 
some gaps in the data in the first 20 years, there are relatively few in the last 21 
years. 
The U.S. Energy Intelligence Agency data provided pricing data for the 
benchmarks North Sea Brent Crude and West Texas Intermediate, intermittently 
going back to January 1978.  It provides data for other blends of oil going back to 
1985 or 1986, depending on the blend.  Using the descriptions and further 
research, I matched each blend with the country(/ies) where they are produced. 
The Penn World Tables provided complete country- and year-level data on 
population, and real gross domestic product per capita from 1960 to 2006.   
The C.I.A. Factbook provided each country’s land area.  A limitation of 
this data is that the land area is that country’s present land area, and borders are 
subject to change.  A mitigating factor for the analysis presented by this paper  is 
that oil producing areas are valuable to the countries that posses them, thus they 
would be more resistant to allowing that land area to change hands. 
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The UPPSALA dataset provided a comprehensive overview of all 
recorded conflicts in the world since 1946.  It distinguished between conflicts 
with less than 25 battle deaths and those with 25 or greater battle deaths. 
 To determine which countries were neighbors with one another, I looked 
at the CIA World Factbook map of each country.  If a country shared a border, it 
was considered a neighbor—be it one established by an arbitrary line or by a 
natural boundary (i.e., ridgeline or river).  Bodies of water separating countries 
were dealt with largely on a case-by-case basis, focusing on navigability.  For 
example, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were considered neighbors because of the 
proximity of the two across the Red Sea near the Sinai Peninsula, as well as the 
significant amount of commerce that transits that body resulting from the Suez 
Canal.  
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III. Informal Results 
 A rudimentary examination of oil production data reveals a great deal 
about its relationship to conflict, as well as other economic factors.  To illustrate 
the estimation strategies in this paper, consider the following case studies. 
Figure 1 examines the case of Angolan oil production. From 1965 to 2002, 
production grows at a steady but slow pace.  During this period, Angola was 
marred by a civil war, which was actually series of distinct but related conflicts.  
A partial explanation of how any growth in oil production occurred during this 
period could be the nature of Angola’s oil reserves.  Much of these reserves lay in 
coastal regions, and can be tapped via off-shore drilling rigs.  These rigs can be as 
far away as 50 miles from shore, effectively isolating them from any events on 
land.  In 2002, the Angolan conflict was effectively concluded, paving the way for 
oil exploration to occur on-shore—making available reserves that previously 
could not be reached safely.  This is the strongest example of a peace dividend, 
similar to that in Iraq in 1988. 
Figure 2 illuminates important points about both Iraqi the effect of conflict 
on oil production and the oil production of Iraq and Kuwait together, to better 
judge the regional and neighbor effects of conflict.  A marked falloff in both Iraqi 
and Kuwaiti oil production occurs in 1980, the same year that the Iran-Iraq War 
began.  As discussed earlier, this conflict had ramifications that extended beyond 
the belligerents; it made commerce difficult, if not dangerous on the Persian Gulf. 
As the war waned, Iraqi oil production began to recover, and to a smaller 
extent, so did Kuwaiti oil production.  All of this recovery went for naught as both 
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Kuwait and Iraq experienced a significant downturn in production in late 1990 at 
the onset of the First Gulf War.  In the aftermath of the war, heavy economic 
sanctions were levied against Iraq, the result being a surge in Kuwaiti oil 
production.  During this period, international sanctions against Iraq act as an 
omitted variable in regressions.  Again in 2003 with the onset of the Second Gulf 
War, Kuwait benefits from Iraq defying the international community. While Iraqi 
oil production declines, Kuwaiti oil production increases, almost matching the 
amount of the decline in Iraqi oil production. 
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IV. Model 
In this section, I will formalize the intuition discussed in the informal 
results section of this paper through four groupings of regressions. 
A. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Conflict on Oil Output 
Ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of conflict on oil output 
were modeled as follows: 
(1) Oil outputi,y = α1(Minor Conflictc,y) + α2(Major Conflictc,y) + εc,y 
Fixed effects regressions were modeled as follows: 
(2-10) Oil outputc,y = β1(Minor Conflictc,y) + β2(Major Conflictc,y) + β3(Xc,y) + εc,y 
Controls, such as population, gross domestic product, land area, oil reserves, oil 
prices, global output, region dummies, year and year squared, country fixed 
effects and year fixed effects, represented by the matrix of Xc,y, were introduced in 
successive regressions, as outlined in the table.   
 B. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Conflict on Oil Prices  
Ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of conflict on oil prices 
were modeled as follows: 
(1) Oil pricec,y = δ1(Minor Conflictc,y) + δ2(Major Conflictc,y) + εc,y 
Fixed effects regressions were modeled as follows: 
(2-8) Oil pricec,y = φ1(Minor Conflictc,y) + φ2(Major Conflictc,y) +  φ3(Xc,y)  + εc,y 
Controls, such as population, gross domestic product, land area, oil reserves, oil 
prices, global output, region dummies, year and year squared, country fixed 
effects and year fixed effects, represented by the matrix of Xc,y, were introduced in 
successive regressions, as outlined in the table.  Running separate regressions for 
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prior to and after 1982 as in Table 1 proved unnecessary as oil price data for 
blends matched with a country experiencing conflict existed only after 1985. 
C. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Neighboring Conflict on Oil 
Output 
Ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of conflict in a neighboring 
country on oil output were modeled as follows: 
(1) Oil outputc,y = β1(Minor Neighbor Conflictc,y) + γ2(MajorNeighbor Conflictc,y) 
+ γ3(Minor Conflictc,y) + γ4(Major Conflictc,y) + εc,y 
Fixed effects regressions were modeled as follows: 
(2-10) Oil outputc,y = θ1(Minor Neighbor Conflictc,y) + θ2(MajorNeighbor 
Conflictc,y) + θ3(Minor Conflictc,y) + θ4(Major Conflictc,y) +  θ5(Xc,y)  + εc,y 
Controls, such as population, gross domestic product, land area, oil reserves, oil 
prices, global output, region dummies, year and year squared, country fixed 
effects and year fixed effects, represented by the matrix of Xc,y, were introduced in 
successive regressions, as outlined in the table. 
 D. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Neighboring Conflict on Oil 
Prices 
Ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of conflict in a neighboring 
country on oil prices were modeled as follows: 
(1) Oil pricec,y = σ1(Minor Neighbor Conflictc,y) + σ2(Major Neighbor Conflictc,y) 
+ σ3(Minor Conflictc,y) + σ4(Major Conflictc,y) + σ5(Xc,y) + εc,y 
Fixed effects regressions were modeled as follows: 
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(2-8) Oil pricec,y = ψ1(Minor Neighbor Conflictc,y) + ψ2(Major Neighbor 
Conflictc,y) + ψ3(Minor Conflictc,y) + ψ4(Major Conflictc,y) + ψ5(Xc,y) + εc,y 
Controls, such as population, gross domestic product, land area, oil reserves, oil 
prices, global output, region dummies, year and year squared, country fixed 
effects and year fixed effects, represented by the matrix of Xc,y, were introduced in 
successive regressions, as outlined in the table.  Running separate regressions for 
prior to and after 1982 as in Table 3 proved unnecessary as oil price data for 
blends matched with a country experiencing conflict existed only after 1985. 
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V. Results 
 A. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Conflict on Oil Output 
 Estimates of the effect of conflict on oil output consistently showed that 
the effect of major conflict were significantly more negative than the effect of 
minor conflict, the extent of which varied with each regression.   
Regressions that include controls for population, real gross domestic 
product per capita, land area and oil reserves, particularly (3) and (6), cut down on 
the dramatic deviation between estimates of the effects of minor and major 
conflicts, as in (2) and (5).  This suggests that the inconsistency between estimates 
of the effects of minor and major conflicts in (2) and (5) is a result of those 
estimates absorbing some of the omitted effect of population, real gross domestic 
product per capita, land area and oil reserves.   
The addition of controls for region via region dummies and for year and 
year squared in (4) makes the estimates of the effects of minor and major conflicts 
significantly more negative as compared to where a similar regression was run 
without those controls, as in (3).  This is suggestive that both region and time, 
when omitted, distort the measurement of the effects of conflict in a manner that 
lessens their negative impact. 
Also, the introduction of controls, particularly in (4), (5) and (6) and 
subsequent regressions modeled after (6), makes the estimates of conflict 
coefficients more precise. 
The models used in regressions (4), (5) and (6), and to a lesser extent (3) 
are effective in explaining variation in oil output, all having r squared values of 
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greater than 0.800.  Variation not explained by the model could result from 
omitted variables such as a given country’s sensitivity to conflict.  It would be a 
mistake to assume that countries react in a uniform manner to conflict, or even 
that conflict is monolithic. 
B. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Conflict on Oil Prices 
As declining oil production resulting from conflict might suggest prices, 
according to estimates of the effects of conflict, increase.  Much as was the case 
with estimates of the effect of conflict on oil output, the effect on oil prices of 
major conflict was greater than that of minor conflict.   
Models estimating the effect of conflict on oil prices were less effective in 
explaining the variation in prices.  While supply plays an important role and 
conflict appears to have some effect in determining price, demand plays and 
equally important role.  Controls for real gross domestic product per capita, 
population, country and year fixed effects could conceivably act to some extent as 
controls for demand.  However, unlike supply, there is no way to say exactly what 
demand is at a given price other than at the actual price, thus making it a difficult 
factor for which to control.  A manifestation of the inefficacy of these controls to 
act as adequate substitutes for demand controls could be that coefficients 
estimated for the effect of conflict on oil prices were fairly consistent across 
regressions with controls.  
Across the regressions, no significant results were yielded for conflicts 
with 25 or fewer battle deaths, whereas estimated coefficients for conflicts with 
greater than 25 battle deaths were significant in all regressions, save (5), (6) and 
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(8).  These regressions fail to generate any significant estimates, a contrast to their 
counterparts examining the effect of conflict on oil production.  The failure of 
controls for country and year fixed effects (the common controls in these 
regressions) to produce significant results in price regressions indicates that while 
they are effective controls in explaining production (supply) of oil, they are 
ineffective controls for demand, the determinant of price. 
C. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Neighboring Conflict on Oil 
Output 
A significant increase in oil output results from conflict in neighboring 
countries as Table 4 outlines.  In conjunction with Table 2, this suggests that 
conflict in the country where it occurs effects on oil output (generally negative) is 
somewhat offset by an increase in oil output in a neighboring country.  Conflict in 
a neighboring country could be a lucrative event.  The increase in output 
diminishes however, when the intensity of the conflict increases each controlled 
regression showed a lesser effect on oil output for neighbor conflicts with more 
than 25 battle deaths than those with 25 or fewer battle deaths. 
The disparity in magnitude between corresponding intensities of neighbor 
conflict and domestic conflict was broader than might have been expected 
(particularly for the gulf high-intensity conflict and neighbor conflict).  In each 
case, the decline in oil production was not matched by the increase in the oil 
production of a neighboring country.  Intuitively, this makes sense—most 
countries have more than one neighbor, so the decline in oil production in one 
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country could be balanced by an increase in production in several neighboring 
countries.   
The effect of high-intensity neighbor conflict on oil production is 
dramatically more positive when the regression was limited to the period between 
1960 and 1982.  The suggestion of this is that either the disruptive effects of 
conflict were more localized, the positive effects of neighbor conflict were less 
pronounced, or some combination of the two. 
D. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Neighboring Conflict on Oil 
Prices 
Table 5 presents regressions that estimate the effects on oil prices of 
blends produced in a given country of conflict in an adjacent country.  Across 
several regressions, there was some evidence that the reaction to conflict in a 
neighboring country was a decline in price.  This fits the story told in Table 4, 
where output generally increased as a result of conflict in a neighboring country.  
However, the changes in price were not a dramatic as the changes in output were 
resulting from the same neighboring conflict. 
Many of the limitations of pricing regressions discussed in subsection B 
continue to hold for the results outlined in Table 5, and even to a greater extent.  
Virtually no significant results were generated.  Coefficients for conflict with 
greater than 25 battle deaths were the only significant results, and only in 
regressions (1), (2) and (3).  However, each of these regressions is significantly 
limited in their explanatory power, none of them having an r squared value higher 
than 0.10. 
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The general tenor of the results is that both intensities of neighbor 
conflicts have a slight negative effect on oil prices, although early regressions 
show a slight positive effect.  Conflict with 25 or fewer battle deaths registered a 
positive effect in regressions (1), (2), (3), and (4), but in subsequent regressions 
hardly showed any effect. 
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VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
 Conflict in a country does effect oil production and to a less clear extent, 
oil prices.  Because of the limitations of pricing results, no comments can be 
offered.  Oil output is generally negatively effected by conflict, to the tune of 
somewhere between 125,000 and 550,000 barrels daily depending on the intensity 
of the conflict.   
Rudimentary arithmetic indicates the cost of this is around $5,000,000-
$22,000,000 per day (assuming a price per barrel of $40).  While the price 
responds positively, somewhere in the range of $2-$4 per barrel, a country would 
need to be producing between 1,125,000 and 2,500,000 barrels daily (roughly the 
2007 daily output of Nigeria, Venezuela or Iraq) just to cover the low end of the 
estimated daily loss from a decline in production. 
Even if this oil production is production that is just delayed rather than lost 
(somewhat of an unlikely proposition, since most country’s infrastructure can 
only support so much production beyond their normal capacity) still incurs 
significant pecuniary losses.  Assuming an interest rate of 5%, there is a loss of 
$250,000 to $1.1 million per day. 
 A country’s oil output increases as a result of a conflict in a neighboring 
country, ranging from 14,000 to almost 300,000 barrels daily depending on the 
intensity of the conflict.  It is unclear how price reacts to conflict in a neighboring 
country, as some regressions show a slightly positive effect, while others show a 
slightly negative one.  Simple arithmetic shows that the benefit of a neighbor 
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conflict is a not insignificant sum, somewhere between $560,000 and $12 million 
per day. 
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VIII. Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Sample Means 
   
Variable  Mean 
   
Neighbor Conflicts  0.2824 
 w/ ≤25 Battle Deaths   
   
Neighbor Conflicts  0.2203 
 w/ >25 Battle Deaths   
   
Conflicts  0.1115 
 w/ ≤25 Battle Deaths   
   
Conflicts  0.0985 
 w/ >25 Battle Deaths   
   
Population  70500000 
   
Real Gross Domestic Product  7153.9 
per Capita   
   
Land Area  1942209 
   
Country Oil Reserves   
   
Oil Prices  26.01 
   
Oil Production  1441.09 
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Table 2: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Effect of Conflict on Oil Output 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
       
1960-
1982 
1983-
2006 Africa & Middle Excl. Africa 
                  East & Middle East 
           
Conflicts w/ ≤25 33.6 117.2 27.8 -126.8 -249.6* -124.7 -5.1 -81.9 -128.2 -196.8 
Battle Deaths (165.5) (127.3) (144.2) (86.5) (84.1) (73.9) (60.1) (76.6) (96.9) (112.8) 
           
Conflicts w/ >25 
-
313.2* -96.2 -20.1 -193.3 -543.7* 
-
252.6* 116.4 -222.8* -312.1* -208.7 
Battle Deaths (146.4) (112.6) (137.9) (108.3) (95.8)** (97.5) (74.4) (103.6) (125.4) (155.9) 
           
Controls for . . .           
Pop, GDP, & Land Area  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Oil Reserves   Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Oil Prices & Global Output   Yes Yes       
Region Dummies    Yes       
Year & Year2    Yes       
Country FEs     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
R2 0.00 0.28 0.82 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.96 
Units: Thousands of barrels daily
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Table 3: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Conflict on Oil Prices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
       Africa & Middle Excl. Africa 
              East & Middle East 
         
Conflicts w/ ≤25 1.4 0.8 0.6 1.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 0.0 
Battle Deaths (2.2) (0.9) (1.0) (0.8) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) 
         
Conflicts w/ >25 -4.6* 4.0* 4.0* 2.3* -0.5 -0.5 -1.2* -0.2 
Battle Deaths (1.6) (1.6) (1.7) (1.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) 
         
Controls for . . .         
Pop, GDP, & Land Area  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country Oil Reserves   Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Oil Prices & Global Output   Yes Yes     
Region Dummies    Yes     
Year & Year2    Yes     
Country FEs     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
R2 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.53 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.91 
Units: Dollars per barrel
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Units: Thousands of barrels daily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1960-1982 1983-2006Africa & MiddleExcl. Africa
East & Middle East
Neighbor Conflicts 20.7 278.9* 49.3 15.4 216.6* 173.1* 39.4 54.9 102.9 256.7*
 w/ ²25 Battle Deaths (109.3) (125.8) (127.8) (80.4) (58.4) (70.8) (166.3) (60.0) (112.0) (78.9)
Neighbor Conflicts 220.9 204.8 -6.1 25.6 37.6 134.4* 272.6* 55.4 36.9 327.3*
 w/ >25 Battle Deaths (123.8) (144.1) (156.5) (91.4) (60.9) (65.4) (127.4) (68.5) (92.0) (93.0)
Conflicts 18.1 95.4 28.5 -131.8 -265.2* -144.0 -0.5 -88.3 -125.6 -228.6*
 w/ ²25 Battle Deaths (168.0) (128.6) (148.4) (87.4) (84.0) (75.1) (68.4) (78.3) (96.6) (110.1)
Conflicts -328.8* -124.1 3.3 -182.5 -551.2* -249.7* 127.8 -224.0* -298.9* -136.7
 w/ >25 Battle Deaths (149.8) (115.8) (158.3) (121.1) (94.5) (97.8) (80.1) (109.6) (126.5) (156.4)
Controls for . . .
Pop, GDP, & Land Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Oil Reserves Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oil Prices & Global Output Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes
Year & Year2 Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.00 0.28 0.82 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.96
Table 4: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Effect of Neighboring Conflict on Oil Output
Skomsky  24 
Units: Dollars per barrel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Africa & MiddleExcl. Africa
East & Middle East
Neighbor Conflicts 0.3 0.6 0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
 w/ ²25 Battle Deaths (1.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.6) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4)
Neighbor Conflicts 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
 w/ >25 Battle Deaths (1.8) (0.8) (0.9) (0.6) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.5)
Conflicts 1.5 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1
 w/ ²25 Battle Deaths (2.2) (1.0) (1.1) (0.9) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6)
Conflicts -4.4* 4.3* 4.4* 2.1 -0.6 -0.6 -1.2 -0.3
 w/ >25 Battle Deaths (1.7) (1.6) (1.7) (1.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6)
Controls for . . .
Pop, GDP, & Land Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Oil Reserves Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oil Prices & Global Output Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes
Year & Year2 Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.53 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.91
Table 5: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Neighboring Conflict on Oil Prices
Skomsky  25 
Figure 1: 
Angolese Oil Production
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Figure 2: 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti Oil Production
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